The Commercial Implication of Normalization by Clarke, William
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 15
The Commercial Implication of Normalization
William Clarke
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland
Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Clarke, The Commercial Implication of Normalization, 5 Md. J. Int'l L. 93 (1979).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol5/iss1/15
CHAPTER VIII.
THE COMMERCIAL IMPLICATION OF NORMALIZATION
William Clarke*
The President's announcement on December 15, 1978 of normalization of
relations with the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) set off a flurry of
activity in our office, reflected by over 300 phone calls and letters a day, the
necessary doubling of our staff (the bureaucratic aspect of my background)
and requests for over 20,000 copies of our report, Doing Business with China.'
These things are reflective of the sweeping interest in the country and of the
potentially enormous new market for American firms. But the President's
action and Chinese action on January 1, 1979 only normalized our political
relations; it did not normalize our economic or commercial relations. There is
still a long way to go.
The joint communiqud that emanated from the Deng visit with the
President at the end of January, 1979 clearly set the stage for the
normalization of our economic and commercial relations, and gave some
impetus to moving quickly ahead with the resolution of the outstanding
issues.2 The communiqu6 called for a trade agreement between the two
countries, a maritime agreement and an air agreement. During the visit, a
cultural agreement was signed,3 as was a consular agreement whereby we
would have consulates in Shanghai and Canton, while the Chinese would
have consulates in Houston and San Francisco.' Negotiations on that latter
point are still underway.
At the end of February, Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Blumenthal
went to China to convert our liaison office into an official embassy on March
1. During the visit, Secretary Blumenthal initialled a claims and assets
* Director, People's Republic of China Affairs in the Bureau of East-West Trade,
Department of Commerce.
1. See p. 148 infra.
2. Joint Communiqug on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China - January 1, 1979, 18
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 274 (1979). See Appendix-Selected Documents p. 105 infra.
3. Cultural Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the People's Republic of China - January 31, 1979, 18 Ir'L
LEGAL MATS. 341 (1979).
4. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Mutual Establishment of Consular
Relations and the Opening of Consulates General - 1979, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 337
(1979).
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settlement' and reached an agreement on establishing a joint economic
committee between the two governments for purposes of discussing trade
problems as they arise in the future.
The past Secretary of Commerce, Juanita Kreps went to the P.R.C. in
early May and continued the momentum that had been developed by the
Deng visit here and by the Blumenthal visit to China. She was able to sign
four scientific and technical acc'ords 6 and to get an agreement from the
Chinese to begin discussions on a civil air agreement. Drafts were exchanged
on a maritime agreement which would contain cargo-sharing provisions. An
agreement was negotiated with the Chinese on the exchange of trade
exhibitions, and the first Chinese trade exhibitions in this country will be in
New York, Chicago and San Francisco in 1980. Secretary Kreps signed the
claims and assets agreement7 which was a significant step in moving our
commercial relationship forward. Most important, she was able to initial a
trade agreement.'
There are quite a few complications in negotiating a trade agreement
with the Chinese. The primary differences were not in principle; the problem
was the difficulty the Chinese had in trying to understand the legal language
we were forced to employ in the draft trade agreement by the Trade Act of
1974.1
The trade agreement is a significant step forward in improving our
relations. It is the keystone around which the full normalization of our
commercial relationship must be built; providing for nondiscriminatory,
"most-favored nation" treatment of China, including tariffs on Chinese
exports to the United States. The agreement also outlines measures to
promote economic and commercial relations and to facilitate the conduct of
business, easing the difficulties in establishing business offices in China. It
also contains assurances relating to financial transactions regarding interna-
tional payments and banking transactions. In addition, the two sides agreed
to facilitate the availability of official export credits. Furthermore, the
agreement endorses procedures for the prompt resolution of commercial
disputes and deals with methods for resolving trade problems that might
arise. Finally, there are provisions regarding the protection of patents,
trademarks and copyrights.
5. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Settlement of Claims -
May 11, 1979, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 551 (1979). See Appendix-Selected Documents p.
131 infra.
6. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1979, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, May 16, 1979, at 2, col. 1.
7. See Settlement of Claims supra note 5.
8. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1979, at 1, col. 5; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1641 (1979).
9. [19741 25 U.S.T. 720, T.I.A.S. No. 7821.
WORK SHOP PROCEEDINGS
The agreement is now subject to review and approval by the two
governments. Until that review is completed, I cannot make a firm prediction
as to when the agreement will be signed and subsequently submitted to the
Congress. We will, however, probably insist on a satisfactory conclusion of
the textile negotiations before submitting the trade agreement to the
Congress.
Let me give you a picture of trade with China in 1979. The first quarter
figure of $500 million indicates that trade could reach a total of $2 billion this
year. At a minimum, the figure would be $1.8 billion, a substantial increase
over the 1978 total of $1.15 billion. More importantly, the favorable balance
of trade would double from $500 million last year. These increases should,
however, be kept in context - our trade with Taiwan was approximately $7.5
billion in 1978.
The sharp rise in the dollar amount of U.S.-China trade this year is
primarily attributable to the return of China to the U.S. agricultural market.
Secretary of Agriculture, Robert Bergland was told that the figure of Chinese
grain purchases from the United States would run five to six million metric
tons each year. In addition to wheat and corn, contracts call for sales of
cotton, soybeans, oil, tallow, hides and skins, and breeding stock.
Presently, the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural U.S. exports to
China is about seven to three. Manufactured goods still have a long way to
go. In the last twelve months, however, some interesting contracts and
agreements have been signed, some of which are worth noting as they are
reflective of the current market and Chinese priorities, and are indicative of
where U.S. firms are competitive.
The Chinese have signed protocols or letters of intent with U.S. firms for
a number of large transactions. United States Steel has signed a $1 billion
agreement with the Chinese and Bethlehem Steel has concluded a deal for
more than $600 million. Kaiser has also signed a protocol. Fluor Corporation
has concluded an $800 million arrangement for a copper project. Both Hyatt
and Intercontinental Hotels have negotiated agreements in excess of $500
million each. Kellogg has sold a plant to the Chinese. The Chinese have also
ordered three Boeing 747 SP jets with an option to purchase two more, a deal
worth more than $200 million. Commodities sales to China for the first
quarter of 1979 include nearly $20 million worth of polyesters, almost $10
million of fertilizer, almost $4 million of pulp paper and more than $10
million worth of agricultural chemicals.
There have also been some significant sales of manufactured goods
including nine Bell 212 helpicopters for more than $12 million; 700 Ford
trucks for about $7 million; $7 million worth of Joy underground mining
equipment; and other purchases of machinery of heavy equipment from
General Electric, Caterpillar, Rexnord and others. Pfizer has sold a million
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dollar body scanner, and Control Data Corporation has sold $69 million worth
of seismic data processing computers. Over $200 million of petroleum
equipment has been sold to China since 1973, much of it by Continental
Emsco and Armco International's National Supply Company. There has also
been a significant amount of petrochemical and other technology involved in
U.S.-China trade over the past six years. One of the most exciting and
potentially most rewarding efforts now underway is the exploration by
American and foreign companies for oil in the South and East China seas.
The Chinese are pinning great hopes on successful developments there.
The bulk of imports from the P.R.C. have been in traditional commodities
such as textiles, tea, fireworks, tin, tungsten and antimony, as well as nails,
antiques, shrimp, feathers and down. Coastal States Gas has begun to import
Chinese crude oil; the first $10 million shipment arrived in March. The deal's
5 million barrels represents, however, only one half day's supply of American
oil imports.
Of course, Sino-American trade is still faced with the textile import
problem and the continuing irritant of U.S. government controls on some
American exports. Also, with the exceptions of the Coca-Cola and Schenleys'
deals, there are no consumer goods in our exports to China. Basically, the
Chinese will not spend their foreign exchange on the importation of consumer
goods. Notable aspects of on-going negotiations with the Chinese anticipate
American participation in coal mining developments, non-ferrous mines, steel
plants, locomotives, diesel engines, trucks, and mining and construction
equipment. The Chinese are also negotiating the purchase of a $500 million
domestic satellite with earth stations.
In general terms, however, the United States still trails Western Europe
and Japan in obtaining a normal share of the China trade. The P.R.C. buys
primarily on the basis of price, quality, and terms, and we have to compete on
that basis. With the January 1st recognition of China, the United States is no
longer discriminated against for political reasons, but there are significant
factors which continue to operate against us. These include the lack of
adequate financing of deals with China, and our lack of knowledge and
experience in dealing with the Chinese, as well as our lack of sufficient
competitiveness which, when coupled with our occasional impatience, is a
significant hindrance to trade. It also must be remembered that U.S.-Chinese
economic and commercial relations have yet to be normalized. The trade
agreement has only been initialled, not yet signed, and the Export-Import
Bank has yet to open its window to China.
As I have indicated, our feelings about trade in 1979 are upbeat; the
final figure could reach $2 billion. To consider prospects beyond 1979 we must
look more closely at the Chinese market and their plans for modernization of
their economy. In fact, we should look at China itself more closely. On the one
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hand, one sees a nation which has detonated nuclear devices and launched
earth satellites. China is a nation which ranks fourth in the world in energy
production and is one of the world's largest textile producers, with a low
inflation rate. It is a nation which extends economic aid to others, and is
succeeding in controlling its birthrate and eradicating, or at least controlling,
most major diseases. On the other hand, one's perception of China must also
include an awareness that eighty percent of its people are engaged in
agricultural pursuits, surely a hallmark of a developing country; seventy
percent of its railroads are still powered by steam, and China's per capita
consumption of power is on a par with that of Bolivia. There are no
privately-owned cars in China and no intercity commerce by truck. Bicycles,
rather than automobiles, cause traffic jams on city streets, and cotton cloth is
rationed. We are only now seeing the beginnings of a tourism industry in
China and the first advertising by foreign companies in the Chinese media.
These contrasts in the perceptions and realities of modern day China suggest
a unique economy.
Any discussion of the trade picture beyond 1979 must make reference to
the current ten year plan outlined by Chairman Hua in 1978 and subsequent
events affecting that plan. As outlined by Hua, the parameters of the plan
encompassed a projected eight year capital investment picture that would be
equal to the total investment of the past twenty-eight years. The plan looked
to an annual agricultural growth rate of four to five percent, which is twice
the rate of agricultural growth from 1952 to 1976. With 120 key projects
earmarked for development, industrial growth was slated to increase at a
rate of more than ten percent each year. To accomplish these goals, Peking
clearly contemplates a major infusion of foreign plants and technology.
This plan, however, appears to be in serious trouble. It is clearly too
ambitious. Some people say that the Chinese, realizing this, are presently
"retrenching." In our meeting with him, Vice Premier Deng made it clear
that the actions the Chinese are currently taking are merely a "readjust-
ment," a compensation for the loss of balance in the Chinese economy over
the past ten years. The purpose, Deng said, is to speed up modernization,
looking both toward the short and the long run.
It is important to understand the constraints and problems that have led
the Chinese leaders to make this readjustment, because the success they have
in controlling them will determine the strength and shape of the market for
American firms in the 1979-85 period. With twenty-two percent of the
world's population subsisting on only seven percent of the world's arable land,
agriculture is, of course, China's number one priority. Each year, feeding this
enormous population requires the use of over $1.5 billion in foreign exchange
reserves on the purchase of grain alone. China is also faced with the
socio-economic problems of putting management back in control of produc-
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tion, maintaining work force discipline and providing material incentives to
the work force without arousing an uncontrollable demand for consumer
goods.
There is also the problem of just how much technology China is capable
of absorbing at the present time. Scientific education and a generation of
scientists and engineers was lost during the Cultural Revolution. There is
also a great contrast between the level of technical skill of cadres in Peking
and those in the countryside. The current program of sending students to the
West for scientific and technical training is an attempt to rectify these
problems, but this will take time. The power, coal, steel and transportation
industries are presently serious bottlenecks to economic modernization. As
much as twenty percent of Chinese productive capacity is inoperative owing
to power shortages. There is the question of military modernization, which
was highlighted by the recent incursion into Vietnam. The omnipresent issue
of political stability of the Chinese government is also a factor in the success
of the modernization plan. The Deng leadership, however, appears to be as
stable as can be expected in the immediate post-Mao period.
Planning and financing the modernization effort have also presented
major problems. There is evidence suggesting that the Chinese leadership did
not fully comprehend the technological complexity of their Ten Year Plan or
their ability to pay for it. We therefore see the cancellation or renegotiation of
what were thought to be firm agreements, and the Chinese reducing the
number of projects under simultaneous construction. It is probable that the
Chinese leadership over-estimated the return from off-shore petroleum
developments and under-estimated the costs of importing plants and tech-
nology.
So, as Deng says, China is in a period of readjustment that will not be
complete until 1981. To date, this readjustment has been manifested by the
suspension of thirty contracts, with Japanese firms totalling $2.7 billion, the
slowdown of ongoing negotiations and a great debate on whether to redirect
the bulk of investment into agriculture and light industry and away from
steel and other heavy industries. Deng told us, however, that readjustment
will not result in a cutback of imports. Indeed, some of the Japanese contracts
have already been renegotiated. Based on the original plan, we estimated a
Chinese import bill of $65 to $80 billion. Even when the estimate is scaled
down to account for the current slowdown, we still estimate import
expenditures of over $40 billion. Indeed, we can see a good part of this
development in agreements and contracts already concluded which have
jumped from $7 to $30 billion.
It is no wonder that we see the Chinese pulling out all stops to maximize
traditional exports, using counter-trade, participating in joint equity projects,
encouraging tourism and attempting to speed up the development of oil and
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other new exports. Even with these efforts, we foresee a cumulative trade
deficit of more than $15 billion from 1979 to 1985. Li Xiannien, China's top
economic manager, has put the figure at $20 billion, which, by the way, is
still less than the U.S. trade deficit for 1978.
We think the gap between earnings and expenditures could be financed.
For instance, the British have offered a $1.2 billion line of credit, the
Japanese have put together a twenty bank syndication extending $2 billion
in credit, and the French have offered $7 billion. Credit has also been
extended by the Canadians and the Italians. But while China is considered a
good credit risk whose purchases could be financed, the Chinese, expressing
their typically self-reliant character, are more concerned over whether they
can pay it back.
The important question is how these changes will affect the economic
chances for American firms in the Chinese market during the modernization
period. The brightest outlook is for agricultural products and petroleum
equipment and technology. There are still many opportunities in the iron ore,
coal and steel industries. Other opportunities exist in the areas of non-ferrous
metals, mining and construction equipment, hydroelectric technology,
machine tools and locomotives, agricultural chemicals and equipment,
electronics such as computers and advanced medical instruments, and
transportation. There may also appear to be good chances for architect-
engineers, engineering contractors and those offering management advisory
services to enter the China market.
The Chinese interest in what we have to offer is strong. Presently, there
are over forty Chinese delegations in the United States. But make no
mistake, the Chinese are here to learn as much as they can. They intend to
copy where feasible, to license where they cannot, and to buy American
hardware only when they have to. It is our job, therefore, to assist them, but
at the same time, to maximize the return to us in doing so. We should not
offer the Chinese a free ride at our expense.
American firms need to understand the Chinese market and approach
negotiations with a willingness to discuss financing, buy-back compensation,
and even equity participation. Our current view of Sino-American trade is
one of measured optimism, not euphoria. Perhaps our two-way trade total
will reach $4-5 billion annually by 1985. The United States will realize some
of these big projects I have talked about, but there is no question that without
Export-Import Bank financing, we will be unable to overcome our present
competitive disadvantage with Western Europe and Japan.
Of course, after the Chinese have run through the first round of billion
dollar loans in the fixed interest range of 6 1/2-7 1/2 percent, there will be
less of that money available for further financing. Banks will be taking a
much harder look at Chinese performance and interest rates will. probably be
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considerably higher. Even then, however, we will remain at a disadvantage
without Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees in the picture.
Of course, I believe it is the opinion of our banking experts that Japan
and Western Europe cannot or will not be willing to provide all the credit
China requires without the participation of the U.S. banking community. The
picture is not all bleak, but putting the Export-Import Bank into the picture
is essential if we are going to be able to approach our overall potential for
trade with the P.R.C. As a result of Secretary Kreps' efforts in getting a trade
agreement initialled, I am heartened that we will eventually be able to get
the Export-Import Bank window open for the Chinese.
In summary, here is where we stand today in our attempt to normalize
Sino-American economic and commercial relations. Trade for 1979 could
reach $2 billion. Beyond that, the market for American goods and services
depends on the degree of success the Chinese have with their program of
readjustment. It is estimated that two-way trade between the United States
and the P.R.C. could reach $4-5 billion annually by 1985. We must bear in
mind, however, that the market for American goods and services depends
largely on full normalization of our economic and commercial relations so
that we can compete fully and equally with Western Europe and Japan.
